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Abstract—We consider the problem of secure communications
in a MIMO setting in the presence of an adversarial jam-
mer equipped with nj transmit antennas and an eavesdropper
equipped with ne receive antennas. A multiantenna transmitter,
equipped with nt antennas, desires to secretly communicate a
message to a multiantenna receiver equipped with nr antennas.
We propose a transmission method based on artificial noise
and linear precoding and a two-stage receiver method em-
ploying beamforming. Under this strategy, we first characterize
the achievable secrecy rates of communication and prove that
the achievable secure degrees-of-freedom (SDoF) is given by
ds = nr−nj in the perfect channel state information (CSI) case.
Second, we consider quantized CSI feedback using Grassmannian
quantization of a function of the direct channel matrix and derive
sufficient conditions for the quantization bit rate scaling as a
function of transmit power for maintaining the achievable SDoF
ds with perfect CSI and for having asymptotically zero secrecy
rate loss due to quantization. Numerical simulations are also
provided to support the theory.
Index Terms—Quantized CSI feedback, MIMO communi-
cation, linear precoding, Grassmann manifold, physical layer
security, secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secrecy in the physical layer is concerned with maximizing
the information rate of a transmitter-receiver pair such that
reliable communication is possible, while keeping the informa-
tion as private as possible if eavesdroppers listen. The seminal
work of Wyner on the wiretap channel [1] has shown that
it is possible to reliably communicate at a strictly positive
rate while an eavesdropper listening to the transmitted signal
through its own channel cannot decode the message. These
results were generalized to Gaussian channels by Leung-Yan-
Cheong and Hellman in [2] and to arbitrary broadcast channels
by Csiszar and Korner in [3]. Following these important early
works, various extensions to different system settings and
assumptions have been made. Particularly, there has been
considerable interest in studying physical layer secrecy for
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian channels, as
the use of multiple antennas can increase secrecy capacity [4],
[5]. In many works, the assumption of the transmitter knowing
its channel to the eavesdropper is often impractical. As a
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result, transmission strategies exploiting multiple antennas and
injecting controlled artificial noise into the transmitted signal
have been proposed in [6] in order to enhance secrecy.
Quantized feedback schemes have been proposed and stud-
ied in the literature for single user and multiple user down-
link communication systems in [7], [8]. Motivated by the
quantization approach of Rezaee & Guillaud [9], [10], which
considered interference alignment for the MIMO interference
channel with quantized channel feedback, we study the value
of quantized feedback for secrecy communications in the
presense of a hostile jammer. A key motivator for our work is
the paper by Krishnamachari et al. [11], where a Grassmannian
feedback scheme was studied in the context of interference
alignment for MIMO interference channel. It was shown that
if the feedback bit rate increases fast enough as a function of
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), the quantized channel estimates
can be used at the transmitters to achieve the full multiplexing
gain. However, communication under secrecy was not consid-
ered in these works on quantized CSI feedback. Optimal power
allocation algorithms and achievable secrecy rates have been
recently studied in the context of secrecy communications with
artificial noise in [12], [13], but no degree-of-freedom (DoF)
analysis is performed and perfect CSI is assumed. To the best
of our knowledge, the value of quantized channel feedback on
the secure DoF gain has not been studied in the literature in the
context of communicating under secrecy and in the presence
of a hostile jammer.
The transmission model that we consider consists of trans-
mitting a linear combination of artificial noise and desired
signal to a receiver. The purpose of the artificial noise is
to confuse the eavesdropper and the desired signal is the
signal to be decoded by the intended receiver. The artificial
noise aspect has been studied in [6], [14], [15], [16]. In [6],
the approach of transmitting artificial noise in the nullspace
of the direct channel matrix was proposed assuming the
number of transmit antennas, nt, are more than the number
of receive antennas, nr. Thus, the designed artificial noise has
no impact on the received signal at the intended receiver, but
causes degradation at the eavesdropper thus enhancing secrecy.
Robust beamforming for secure MIMO communications was
studied in [15] under inaccurate CSI using a second-order
perturbation analysis. The effect of delayed perfect CSIT on
the SDoF gain was studied in [16] in the context of the two-
user broadcast MIMO channel. In [14], the optimal power
allocation among artificial noise and desired signal is derived
such that the ergodic secrecy rate is maximized for a fixed
number of feedback bits and transmit power. In addition,
a scaling law between feedback bits and power is derived
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2to guarantee a constant secrecy rate loss compared to the
perfect CSI case. Our work differs from these works since we
derive explicit conditions for the quantization bit scaling that
guarantee the optimal SDoF scaling, under similar assumptions
on channel values as made in [11], and in addition we consider
a jammer interfering with the received signal and show that
the secrecy rate loss due to quantization is asymptotically
negligible as SNR grows. Furthermore, our work differs from
[14] because we consider quantization of a function of the
direct channel matrix using (deterministic) quantization theory
on the Grassmann manifold, adopt different channel conditions
as adopted in [9], [10], [11] and thus, develop different proof
techniques. In addition, the SDoF performance of artificial
noise transmission schemes has not been studied in [6], and
we also consider the lack of instantaneous perfect CSI by
assuming the availability of quantized CSI. Our work differs
from [15], [16] in that we consider a jammer and the effect
of Grassmannian-based quantized instantaneous CSI on SDoF
gain in a point-to-point MIMO channel.
In our problem formulation, the receiver’s strategy is to null
out the jammer interference and use its remaining resources
to recover the information-bearing signal from the transmitter
through beamforming. Under perfect CSI conditions, assuming
nt > nr, the transmitter designs the artificial noise signal to lie
in the nullspace of the channel matrix Hd and the information-
bearing signal to lie in the orthogonal complement of the
null space of Hd. Under this linear precoding strategy, the
receiver sees no leakage due to artificial noise in the received
signal. However, if the transmitter has imperfect CSI, then
the received signal will contain a non-negligible amount of
artificial noise. In the high SNR regime, this leakage will
deteriorate the secrecy rate performance and drive the SDoF
to zero. In order to maintain the full SDoF gain of the system,
the rate of quantized feedback needs to increase appropriately
as a function of SNR. In this paper, we characterize this rate
and identify the key parameters associated with it. We also
prove that, as the transmit power grows asymptotically, there
is no loss in secrecy rate performance due to quantization.
A. Outline
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section II formulates
the basic problem. Section III studies the achievable secrecy
communication rates in the case of perfect CSI. Section IV
studies the case of quantized CSI and derives performance
bounds on the achievable secure degrees-of-freedom. The
theory is illustrated by simulation in Section V and is followed
by our conclusions in Section VI.
B. Notation
We use R and C to denote the real and complex fields. We
use boldface lowercase letters x to denote vectors and bold
uppercase letters A for matrices. Given a matrix A ∈ Cm×n,
we let A∗ denote its Hermitian conjugate, and AT denote its
transpose. The trace operator tr(·) on a square matrix is simply
the sum of its diagonal entries. Let Nul(A) and Col(A) denote
the nullspace and column spaces (i.e., range) of the matrix A.
We let Nc(µ,Σ) denote the complex multivariate normal
distribution with mean µ and covariance Σ. Consider two
sequence of real numbers {aP } and {bP } indexed by P .
Consider two sequences {aP } and {bP }. The asymptotic
notation aP = O(bP ) as P → ∞ implies that there exists
K > 0, P0 such that for all P ≥ P0, we have |aP | ≤ K|bP |.
The asymptotic notation aP = o(bP ) means that for all  > 0,
there exists P0() = P0 such that for all P ≥ P0, we have
|aP | ≤ |bP |. We use log(·) to denote the logarithm with
base 2 and loge(·) to denote the natural logarithm. Define the
thresholding operator (·)+ = max(·, 0).
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the point-to-point MIMO channel with a trans-
mitter (Tx) and a legitimate receiver (Rx). There is a jammer
(J) degrading the received signal at Rx and an eavesdropper
(Eve) observing a noisy version of the transmitted signal.
Define the channel matrices Hd ∈ Cnr×nt as the channel
between Tx and Rx, He ∈ Cne×nt as the channel between
the Tx and Eve and Hj ∈ Cnr×nj as the channel between J
and the Rx. The received signals at the legitimate receiver and
Eve are respectively given by:
y = Hdx + Hjxj + n (Rx) (1)
y¯ = Hex + n¯ (Eve) (2)
where x is the transmitted signal and xj is the jammer signal.
The additive receiver noises n and n¯ are assumed to be
white and Gaussian distributed, i.e., n ∼ Nc(0, σ2Inr ), n¯ ∼
Nc(0, σ¯2Ine).
In this paper, we assume that Eve and J and cooperative
in the sense that the jammer does not interfere with the
eavesdropper signal. This can be realized in one of two
ways. One way that this can be realized is if Eve and J
are one simultaneous-transmit-and-receive unit, comprised of
ne receive antennas and nj transmit antennas as depicted in
Figure 1. Another way that this can be realized is to have
Eve and J be separate nodes with Eve having Ne = ne + nj
receive antennas and J having nj transmit antennas. Then, Eve
can null out the undesired jammer interference by projecting
its received signal in a subspace of dimension ne, leading to
the linear observation model (2). To illustrate this, say that
Eve has Ne receive antennas and observes:
ye = Gex + Gjxj + ne
where Ge is the channel from Tx to Eve, Gj is the channel
from J to Rx and ne is the receiver thermal noise at Eve.
Considering the SVD of Gj = UjΣjV∗j , we can choose
U0,j ∈ CNe×ne to consist of the columns of Uj corre-
sponding to zero singular values. Then, defining the projection
y¯ = U∗0,jye
1, we obtain the model (2) with He = U∗0,jGe
and n¯ = U∗0,jne. Under the assumption that channel matrix
elements are drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution, it
follows that with probability 1, He is full-rank and the
equivalent model (2) can be used without loss of generality.
1Here, Nul(U∗0,j) = Col(Gj) is the nullspace condition that is used in
the nulling operation.
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Fig. 1: Block diagram of secrecy communication problem in
the presence of a jammer.
As in [11], [9], [10], we assume all elements of the channel
matrices are drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution, and
the channel values do not change during the signal transmis-
sion. The receiver is assumed to have perfect knowledge of
Hd and Hj . As assumed in [11], [9], [10] we assume there is
an error-free feedback link from the receiver to the transmitter.
During the initial channel feedback phase, the receiver trans-
mits its CSI using Nf bits due to limited bandwidth. Data
transmission then follows where the transmitter designs its
signal using quantized feedback.
A. Transmitter Strategy
Assuming nt > nr, the channel matrix Hd has rank
equal to nr, which implies that there are nt − nr dimensions
available for artificial noise and nr dimensions for information
transmission.
We assume the transmitter splits its available power P
into two components, the artificial noise and the information-
bearing signal, using a linear combination:
x =
√
ρW1xs +
√
1− ρW2xan (3)
where xs ∈ Cnr is the information bearing signal, xan ∈
Cnt−nr is artificial noise and ρ is the percentage of power
allocated to xs. The linear precoding matrices W1 ∈ Cnt×nr
and W2 ∈ Cnt×nt−nr are assumed to be truncated unitary
matrices. We also assume that xs is independent of xan. We
let the covariance matrices of xs and xan be given by Kxs ∈
Cnr×nr and Kxan ∈ C(nt−nr)×(nt−nr), respectively.
In order to design (W1,W2) such that the artificial noise
component cancels out at the receiver, the columns of W2
must lie in the null space of Hd ∈ Cnr×nt . This can be
accomplished through the singular value decomposition (SVD)
of Hd. Then, HdW2 = 0.
B. Receiver Strategy
The receiver has instantaneous knowledge of Hd and Hj .
To null out the jammer’s signal, the post-processing truncated
unitary matrix V ∈ Cnr×nr−nj at the receiver is applied:
y˜ = V∗y = V∗Hdx + n˜ (4)
where n˜ = V∗n ∼ Nc(0, σ2I) since V∗V = Inr−nj .
Consider the SVD of Hj :
Hj = U(Hj)Σ(Hj)V(Hj)
∗
= [U1(Hj)|U0(Hj)]
[
Σ1(Hj)
0nr−nj×nj
]
V(Hj)
∗
Choosing the columns of V span the left nullspace of Hj , i.e.,
V = U0(Hj) (5)
yields the desired nulling condition V∗Hj = 0.
C. Secrecy Degrees-of-Freedom (SDoF)
The secrecy capacity is known as a quantity measuring the
maximal rate of reliable communication while maintaining
secrecy to Eve [3]. The secrecy capacity is generally known
to be [3], [5], [17]:
Cs = max
Kxs0,tr(Kxs )≤P
(I(xs; y˜)− I(xs; y¯))+
where I(X;Y ) denotes the mutual information between X
and Y [18].
For a given input covariance matrix Kxs satisfying the
power constraint tr(Kxs) ≤ P , the achievable secrecy rate
under the models (3) and (4) is given by:
Rs(Kxs) = (I(xs; y˜)− I(xs; y¯))+ (6)
As Theorem 1 shows (see Appendix A), Rs(Kxs) will be
positive for P large enough under certain assumptions, and
thus the thresholding operator (·)+ can be omitted for the high
SNR analysis to be presented in this paper. The (achievable)
secure degrees-of-freedom (SDoF) are defined as:
ds = lim
P→∞
Rs(Kxs)
logP
The intuitive meaning of this metric is that there are ds data
streams that can be reliably communicated to the receiver
without having the eavesdropper being able to decode the
transmitted information.
III. PERFECT CSI: ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE & SDOF
For the case of perfect CSI at the transmitter, the pre-
coding matrix W2 can be designed as W2 = V0(Hd) ∈
Cnt×(nt−nr), where the SVD of Hd ∈ Cnr×nt is given by
Hd = U(Hd)Σ(Hd)V(Hd)
∗
= U(Hd) [Σ1(Hd)|0nr×nt−nr ] [V1(Hd)|V0(Hd)]∗
In that case, we can also choose W1 = V1(Hd) ∈ Cnt×nr
in order to guarantee orthogonality between the information
bearing signal W1xs and the artificial noise signal W2xan.
Then, the post-processed received signal at Rx and the received
signal at Eve become:
y˜ =
√
ρV∗HdW1xs + n˜
=
√
ρV∗U(Hd)Σ1(Hd)V1(Hd)∗V1(Hd)xs + n˜
=
√
ρV∗U(Hd)Σ1(Hd)xs + n˜
=
√
ρHxs + n˜
y¯ =
√
ρHeV1(Hd)xs +
√
1− ρHeV0(Hd)xan + n¯
=
√
ρHe,sxs +
√
1− ρHe,anxan + n¯
4where we defined H = V∗U(Hd)Σ1(Hd) as the transformed
(nr − nj)× nr channel matrix after post-processing. We also
defined He,s = HeV1(Hd) and He,an = HeV0(Hd).
Using these expression for the received signals and the
Gaussian noise assumptions, along with (6), we obtain an
expression for the achievable secrecy rate under perfect CSI:
Rs(Kxs) = log det
(
I +
ρ
σ2
HKxsH
∗
)
− log
(
det(ρHe,sKxsH
∗
e,s +
(1−ρ)P
nt−nr He,anH
∗
e,an + σ¯
2I)
det( (1−ρ)Pnt−nr He,anH
∗
e,an + σ¯
2I)
)
where we used Kxs = Cov(xs) and Kxan = Cov(xan) =
P
nt−nr Int−nr .
The next theorem shows that nr − nj SDoF are achievable
under several mild assumptions.
Theorem 1. Assume the following:
• there exists constants c0, c1 ∈ (0, 1/nr] such that
c0P I  Kxs  c1P I (7)
• nt > nr > nj
• ne ≤ nt − nr
In the case of perfect CSI, it is possible to achieve up to
ds = nr − nj SDoF at most.
Proof: See Appendix A.
We remark that the SDoF ds is independent of ne because
the eavesdropper’s rate I(xs; y¯) converges to a constant,
dependent on ne, and thus it has an asymptotically vanishing
contribution to the SDoF, i.e., I(xs;y¯)logP → 0 as P →∞.
The achievable ds = nr − nj secure DoF is optimal since
the jammer signal lies in a nj-dimensional space and to null it
out without any knowledge of its intrinsic dimension, receive
beamforming leaves nr − nj effective number of antennas at
the receiver to use for successful decoding of the transmitted
message.
The sufficient conditions of Thm. 1 are very mild, given
our goal of achieving nr−nj SDoF. If the condition nt > nr
is violated, the right nullspace of Hd is empty, which implies
that no precoding matrix W2 exists such that HdW2 = 0. If
nr > nj is violated, then no post-processing matrix V exists
such that V∗Hj = 0, i.e., the receiver does not have enough
antennas to cancel the jammer’s signal. If ne > nt − nr, then
the eavesdropper has enough antennas to recover at least one
data stream containing information because the artificial noise
signal spans at most a (nt − nr)-dimensional space, leading
to zero secrecy. The assumption ne +nr ≤ nt was also made
in Section VI in [14]. Thus, all assumptions are necessary to
proceed.
IV. QUANTIZED CSI: ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE &
SDOF
When there is imperfect CSI knowledge at the transmitter,
the condition HdW2 = 0 will be violated and there will
be some leakage of artificial noise at the receiver. As a
consequence, the result of Theorem 1 no longer holds. In this
section, we show that the same number of secure degrees-
of-freedom can be achieved if the feedback rate scales fast
enough as a function of transmit power.
A. Quantization on the Grassmann manifold
We assume that the receiver has perfect knowledge of the
channel Hd. Thus, it can perform the QR decomposition of
the conjugate transpose of the channel matrix, i.e., H∗d:
H∗d = FC (8)
where C ∈ Cnr×nr is an invertible matrix and F ∈ Cnt×nr
is a tall orthonormal matrix whose columns span the same
column space of H∗d. Thus, from the invertibility of C, the
condition HdW2 = 0 is equivalent to F∗W2 = 0. A similar
decomposition approach was considered in [10] for the MIMO
interference channel. As in [10], a quantizer at the receiver
uses Nf bits to describe the columns of F and transmits
the index of the quantized codeword back to the transmitter
through a noiseless feedback link. The transmitter and receiver
share a predefined codebook S = {S1, . . . ,S2Nf } consisting
of truncated unitary matrices of size nt×nr, which is designed
using Grassmannian subspace packing. The quantization of the
matrix F on the Grassmann manifold Gnt,nr is mathematically
described by the minimum distance problem:
Fˆ = arg min
S∈S
dc(S,F) (9)
where dc(S,F) = 1√2‖SS∗ − FF∗‖F is the chordal distance
between S and F in Gnt,nr .
B. Transmitter Strategy under Quantized CSI
Given the quantized matrix Fˆ ∈ Cnt×nr , the transmitter
designs the linear precoding matrices W1,Q and W2,Q. Let
the matrix W2,Q ∈ Cnt×nt−nr be chosen such that
Fˆ∗W2,Q = 0nr×nt−nr (10)
This can be accomplished if the columns of W2,Q are chosen
to span the nullspace of Fˆ∗. We thus let W2,Q be chosen such
that its columns form a basis for Nul(Fˆ∗).
In order to maximize the amount of information being sent
over the noisy channel Hd, the precoded information signal
W1,Qxs must always be orthogonal to the precoded artificial
noise signal W2,Qxan. In order for this to hold irrespective of
the signals xs and xan, W1,Q must be orthogonal to W2,Q.
This orthogonality implies that the matrix W1,Q ∈ Cnt×nr
must lie in the orthogonal complement of Nul(Fˆ∗). In other
words, we let the columns of W1,Q form a basis for Col(Fˆ),
i.e, W1,Q = Fˆ.
C. Receiver Strategy under Quantized CSI
Given y, the receiver uses a post-processing matrix to form
the transformed vector:
yˇ = G∗V∗y (11)
where V is the nulling matrix for the jammer defined in (5)
and y is the received signal in (1). Given that V is already
chosen using (5), we want to design G ∈ Cds×ds as a function
of V,F,C (all of which are available at the receiver). Let us
choose G as:
G∗ = B∗FCV(V∗C∗CV)−1 (12)
5where B ∈ Cnt×ds is a tall truncated unitary matrix of full
rank.
Let the leakage term be given by
eL =
√
1− ρG∗V∗HdW2,Qxan
The post-processed received signal can be written as
yˇ = G∗(V∗Hdx + n˜)
=
√
ρG∗V∗HdW1,Qxs + eL + G∗n˜
D. Controlling the Leakage Power
The next lemma bounds the power of the leakage term.
Lemma 1. Assuming a quantization codebook construction
based on sphere-packing using Nf bits, the leakage power is
bounded as:
L(P ) := E‖eL‖22 ≤
2(1− ρ)P
nt − nr
(
2
(c2Nf )1/N
)2
(1+o(2−Nf/N ))
(13)
where N = 2nr(nt − nr) and c is a constant.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The corollary that follows provides a sufficient condition
on the feedback rate to ensure that the leakage power stays
bounded. This will be a key condition that will be used to
prove the optimal SDoF scaling.
Corollary 1. Assume that the quantization with Nf feedback
bits scales as:
Nf =
N
2
log2 P = nr(nt − nr) log2 P (14)
Then, the leakage power L(P ) stays bounded as P →∞, i.e.,
L(P ) = O(1) as P →∞.
Proof: See Appendix C.
We note that boundedness of the leakage power does
not necessarily imply the achievability of the optimal SDoF.
However, it provides a grasp on the feedback bit rate scaling
that can possibly guarantee such a claim. Next, we show that
the scaling condition (14) is sufficient to guarantee the optimal
SDoF gain.
E. SDoF Analysis
Here, we show that the secrecy rate of the quantized CSI
scheme achieves the same SDoF as the corresponding scheme
with perfect CSI as derived in Theorem 1. In other words,
there is no performance loss for large enough SNR.
Under the transmitter and receiver strategies proposed for
quantized CSI, the achievable secrecy rate when CSI is perfect
is given in (15) by:
RPs,G = R
P
s,G(Kxs) = I(xs; yˇ)− I(xs; y¯),
where the subscript s denotes secrecy and the subscript G
denotes post-processing with the matrix G∗ in addition to V∗
(recall (11)). Similarly, when only quantized CSI is available,
the achievable secrecy rate is given by RQs,G in (16), where
(W1,Q,W2,Q) are the designed precoding matrices under
imperfect CSI. We note that in general W1 6= W1,Q and
W2 6= W2,Q, although they have the same rank.
Before proving the main result, we will need a few technical
lemmas. We first recall the variational representation of the
log-determinant function.
Lemma 2. [19] Let E ∈ Cn×n be a positive definite matrix.
Then,
loge det(E
−1) = max
S0
{−tr(SE) + loge det(S) + n}
and the optimal solution is S∗ = E−1.
Lemma 2 implies the following perturbation bounds, which
will be crucial for analyzing the secrecy rate performance.
Lemma 3. Let A and A + ∆ be positive definite matrices.
Then, the following bounds hold:
loge det(A + ∆)− loge det(A) ≤ tr(A−1∆)
loge det(A + ∆)− loge det(A) ≥ tr(∆(A + ∆)−1)
We will need a technical lemma that yields an asymptotic
lower bound to a remainder term that will be crucial for
proving the main result of the paper (Theorem 2).
Lemma 4. Consider the transmitter and receiver strategies
described in Section IV. Assume the same conditions as in
Theorem 1. In addition, assume (14). Define the auxiliary
variable β(P ) as:
β(P ) = log det
(
ρPG∗V∗HdW1,QW∗1,QH
∗
dVG
+ (1− ρ) P
nt − nrG
∗V∗HdW2,QW∗2,QHdVG + σ
2G∗G
)
− log det (ρPG∗V∗HdW1,QW∗1,QH∗dVG + σ2G∗G)
Then, there exists a non-negative sequence {(P )} converging
to zero such that for all P :
β(P ) ≥ −(P )
Proof: See Appendix D.
The main result of the paper is provided in Theorem 2,
where the optimal SDoF is shown to be obtained under the
quantized feedback of CSI. In addition, it is shown that there
is no secrecy rate loss due to quantization asymptotically as
P →∞.
Theorem 2. Consider the transmitter and receiver strategies
described in Section IV. Assume the same conditions as in
Theorem 1.
1) Assuming (14), i.e.,
Nf =
N
2
log2 P
then, the full dQs = ds = nr − nj SDoF are achievable.
2) Assuming for some  > 0,
Nf = (1 + )
N
2
log2 P (17)
then, the full dQs = ds = nr − nj SDoF are achievable
and the asymptotic rate gap due to quantization δGAP :=
limP→∞{RPs,G −RQs,G} is zero.
6RPs,G = log
(
det(ρG∗V∗HdW1KxsW
∗
1H
∗
dVG + σ
2G∗G)
det(σ2G∗G)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TP+
− log
(
det(ρHeW1KxsW
∗
1H
∗
e +
(1−ρ)P
nt−nr HeW2W
∗
2H
∗
e + σ¯
2Ine)
det( (1−ρ)Pnt−nr HeW2W
∗
2H
∗
e + σ¯
2Ine)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TP−
(15)
RQs,G = log
(
det(ρG∗V∗HdW1,QKxsW
∗
1,QH
∗
dVG +
(1−ρ)P
nt−nr G
∗V∗HdW2,QW∗2,QH
∗
dVG + σ
2G∗G)
det( (1−ρ)Pnt−nr G
∗V∗HdW2,QW∗2,QH
∗
dVG + σ
2G∗G)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TQ+
− log
(
det(ρHeW1,QKxsW
∗
1,QH
∗
e +
(1−ρ)P
nt−nr HeW2,QW
∗
2,QH
∗
e + σ¯
2Ine)
det( (1−ρ)Pnt−nr HeW2,QW
∗
2,QH
∗
e + σ¯
2Ine)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TQ−
(16)
Proof: See Appendix E.
Remark 1. The scaling condition (17) can be weakened to
Nf =
N
2
log2(Pm(P ))
where m(P ) is any nonnegative function satisfying m(P ) →
∞ as P →∞.
We finally remark that having Nf be a monotonically
increasing function in P is not enough to guarantee δGAP = 0.
This can be seen from the proof of Theorem 2, where in order
for δGAP to converge to zero as P →∞, we need the following
condition to hold:
U(P ) = P ·G∗V∗HdW2,QW∗2,QH∗dVG→ 0
which implies that G∗V∗HdW2,QW∗2,QH
∗
dVG = o(P
−1).
The condition Nf → ∞ alone only implies
G∗V∗HdW2,QW∗2,QH
∗
dVG = o(1) and does not guarantee
U(P ) → 0. Necessary conditions that guarantee the results
of Theorem 2 remain an open problem.
V. SIMULATIONS
This section contains a few illustrative simulations that
validate the methodology presented throughout the paper. The
elements of all channels were generated as i.i.d. random
complex-normal Nc(0, 1) random variables as in [9], [10].
Figure 2 shows the secrecy rate performance as a function
of transmit SNR for nr = 2, 3, 4 where nj = 1 and
nt = 2nr, ne = nt − nr = nr. The feedback bit rate
increases as a function of P according to (14) for the left
panel and according to (17) for the right panel. The secrecy
rate for the perfect CSI and quantized CSI schemes were
calculated using the expressions in (15) and (16) with the
choices Kxs =
P
nr
Inr and Kxan =
P
nt−nr Int−nr . Due to the
high complexity associated with implementing (9) for large bit
rates Nf , we adopt the random perturbation scheme of [10] to
generate the quantized matrices Fˆ2. It was shown numerically
2The reason why nt ≥ 2nr is chosen here has to do with the approximation
of the quantization. While not pursued in this paper, the case nt < 2nr can
be covered in a similar manner. For more details, see Section VI.B in [10].
in [10] that this approximation is fairly accurate for a wide
range of SNR. It is evident from Figure 2 that the slopes of the
secrecy rate curves become identical as SNR grows, implying
that the SDoF become identical, as expected from Theorem 2.
In addition, for Nf =
(1+)N
2 log2 P with  = 0.5, the right
panel of Figure 2 shows that the secrecy rate gap covnerges
to zero as P grows to infinity.
Figure 3 shows the secrecy rate performance as a function
of SNR for nr = 3 where nt = 2nr and ne = nt − nr.
The feedback bit rate is fixed to Nf = 30, 60, 90 and it is
observed that the secrecy rate converges to a limiting value
as the transmit SNR grows to infinity. Similar behavior is
observed for the communication rate performance with finite
rate feedback without secrecy or jamming in [9], [10], [7],
[8] and without jamming in [14]. This phenomenon is due
to the fact that finite quantization bit rate allows the artificial
noise to dominate at the receiver and as a result, the secure
multiplexing gain becomes zero.
Figure 4 shows the loss in secrecy rate due to quantization,
for fixed SNR and number of antennas, as a function of
number of feedback bits Nf . The SNR is fixed to SNR =
10, 20, 30 dB and we observe that the secrecy rate loss
converges to zero fast as Nf grows. We conjecture that this
rate gap converges to zero exponentially fast as a function of
Nf .
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the value of quantized feedback for MIMO
secrecy communications in the presence of a jammer. We
proposed transmitter and receiver strategies based on linear
precoding and receive beamforming to simultaneously combat
jammer interference, imperfect CSI at the transmitter and
eavesdropping. Under this MIMO communication model, we
characterized the achievable secrecy rate performance of the
system. We derived sufficient conditions on the feedback bit
rate scaling as a function of transmit power that guarantees the
same secure degrees-of-freedom as the corresponding scheme
with perfect CSI. We also showed that there is no secrecy
rate loss due to quantization asymptotically as P →∞ under
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Fig. 2: Monte Carlo simulation for secrecy rate performance as a function of SNR for Nf = N2 log2 P (left panel) and Nf =
(1+0.5)N
2
log2 P (right panel). The transmitter has nt = 2nr antennas and the receiver has nr = 2, 3, 4 antennas. The jammer is equipped
with one antenna, i.e., nj = 1, and the eavesdropper is equipped with ne = nt − nr = nr antennas. Equal power allocation ρ = 1/2
was used. For high SNR, the slope of the secrecy rate curves corresponding to quantized CSI become identical to the slope of the curves
with perfect CSI, as predicted by Theorem 2. The corresponding slopes are ds = 1, 2, 3. As predicted in Theorem 2, the secrecy rate gap
converges to zero as P →∞ since Nf increases slightly faster than prescribed in (14) (see right panel).
the same conditions. Simulations were shown to validate the
theoretical analysis.
Future work may include deriving necessary conditions on
the feedback bit rate to maintain the optimal secure degrees-of-
freedom and developing efficient power allocations algorithms
to improve performance in the low SNR regime. Another
worthwhile open problem is to bound the secrecy rate gap
as a function of finite power P and number of feedback bits
Nf . This type of analysis would provide insight into how many
feedback bits are needed to achieve an arbitrarily small secrecy
rate gap.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Decompose Rs into two components Rs = Rds −
REs where
Rds = log det
(
I +
ρ
σ2
HKxsH
∗
)
REs = log
(
det(ρHe,sKxsH
∗
e,s +
(1−ρ)P
nt−nr He,anH
∗
e,an + σ¯
2I)
det( (1−ρ)Pnt−nr He,anH
∗
e,an + σ¯
2I)
)
Expanding Rds , we obtain:
Rds =
nr−nj∑
i=1
log
(
1 +
ρ
σ2
λi(HKxsH
∗)
)
= ds log(P ) +
ds∑
i=1
log
(
P−1 +
ρ
σ2
λi(HKxsH
∗)
P
)
(18)
Using (7), it is guaranteed that all eigenvalues λi(HKxsH
∗)
satisfy the bounds:
c0Pλi(HH
∗) ≤ λi(HKxsH∗) ≤ c1Pλi(HH∗) (19)
Since the matrix HH∗ is positive definite almost surely, using
(19) into (18) and taking the limit as P → ∞, we obtain
Rds
log(P )
P→∞−→ ds. To finish the proof, it remains to show
REs
log(P )
P→∞−→ 0. To prove this, note that REs converges to a
constant as P →∞:
REs
= log det
(
I + ρHe,sKxsH
∗
e,s
(
(1− ρ)PHe,anH∗e,an
nt − nr + σ¯
2I
)−1)
≤ log det
(
I + c1ρPHe,sH
∗
e,s
(
(1− ρ)PHe,anH∗e,an
nt − nr + σ¯
2I
)−1)
= log det
(
I + c1ρHe,sH
∗
e,s
(
(1− ρ)He,anH∗e,an
nt − nr + σ¯
2P−1I
)−1)
P→∞→ log det
(
I + c1
ρ(nt − nr)
1− ρ He,sH
∗
e,s
(
He,anH
∗
e,an
)−1)
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Fig. 3: Monte Carlo simulation for secrecy rate loss due to quanti-
zation as a function of SNR for Nf = 30, 60, 90. The transmitter
has nt = 2nr antennas and the receiver has nr = 3 antennas. The
eavesdropper has ne = nt − nr = 3 antennas and the eavesdropper
has a single antenna. Equal power allocation ρ = 1/2 was used. The
secrecy rate saturates to a limiting value as SNR grows, implying
zero SDoF gain.
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Fig. 4: Monte Carlo simulation for secrecy rate loss due to quan-
tization as a function of Nf for fixed SNR. The transmitter has
nt = 2nr antennas and the receiver has nr = 3 antennas. The jam-
mer has nj = 1 antenna and the eavesdropper has ne = nt−nr = 3
antennas. Equal power allocation ρ = 1/2 was used. The secrecy rate
gap converges to zero fast as the number of feedback bits increase.
Note that we used the fact that ne ≤ nt − nr, implying that
He,anH
∗
e,an is full rank. Using a similar argument and (7)
again, it follows that REs is bounded below by a constant as
P → ∞ as well. Thus, REs / log(P ) → 0 and the proof is
complete.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: The transmitter has access to Fˆ, a quantized
version of F, which is obtained using (9). The transmitter
designs W2,Q such that Fˆ∗W2,Q = 0 (recall (10)). Letting
Mˆ = FˆU, we also have Mˆ∗W2,Q = 0. Using this, we obtain:
G∗V∗HdW2,Q = G∗V∗C∗F∗W2,Q
= B∗FCV(V∗C∗CV)−1(CV)∗F∗W2,Q
Consider the square invertible positive definite matrix
P = CV(V∗C∗CV)−1(CV)∗ (20)
This matrix can be seen as a projection onto the column space
of CV. Write the eigendecomposition of P as UΛU∗. Then,
continuing:
G∗V∗HdW2,Q = B∗FPF∗W2,Q
= B∗FUΛU∗F∗W2,Q
= B∗MΛM∗W2,Q
= B∗MΛM∗W2,Q −B∗MˆMˆ∗W2,Q
= B∗(MΛM∗ − MˆMˆ∗)W2,Q
The leakage power can then be bounded as:
L = E‖
√
1− ρG∗V∗HdW2,Qxan‖22
≤ (1− ρ)E‖xan‖22‖G∗V∗HdW2,Q‖2F (21)
=
(1− ρ)P
nt − nr ‖B
∗(MΛM∗ − MˆMˆ∗)W2,Q‖2F
≤ (1− ρ)P
nt − nr ‖B
∗‖22‖MΛM∗ − MˆMˆ∗‖2F ‖W2,Q‖22
=
(1− ρ)P
nt − nr ‖MΛM
∗ − MˆMˆ∗‖2F (22)
where we used the fact that ‖B∗‖2 = ‖W2,Q‖2 = 1 since
they are truncated unitary matrices.
Since P is a projection matrix, it follows its eigenvalues
[Λ]i,i are either 1 or 0. As a result, we have:
‖MΛM∗‖2F ≤ ‖MM∗‖2F (23)
and since I−Λ =: D consists of zeros or ones on the diagonal,
we also have:
tr(Mˆ∗M(I−Λ)(Mˆ∗M)∗) = tr(M˜DM˜∗) = tr(DM˜∗M˜)
=
∑
i
[D]i,i[M˜
∗M˜]i,i ≥ 0 (24)
Using (23) and (24), we obtain:
‖MΛM∗ − MˆMˆ∗‖2F ≤ ‖MM∗ − MˆMˆ∗‖2F (25)
Using the bound (25) in (22), we obtain:
L ≤ (1− ρ)P
nt − nr ‖MM
∗ − MˆMˆ∗‖2F
=
(1− ρ)P
nt − nr ‖FF
∗ − FˆFˆ∗‖2F
=
2(1− ρ)P
nt − nr dc(F, Fˆ)
2 (26)
9where we used UU∗ = Inr and the definition of the chordal
distance.
Assuming a sphere-packing codebook construction, Thm. 5
in [20] yields a bound on the maximum quantization error:
max
F∈Gnt,nr
dc(F, Fˆ) ≤ 2
(c2Nf )1/N
(1 + o(2−
Nf
N )) (27)
where Fˆ is obtained using (9) and c is the coefficient of the
ball volume in Gnt,nr 3. Using the quantization error bound
(27) in (26), we obtain the desired bound in (13).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof: With the choice Nf = N/2 log2 P , Lemma 1
implies
L ≤ 2(1− ρ)P
nt − nr
4/c2
P
(1 + o(P−1/2))
P→∞−→ 8(1− ρ)/c
2
nt − nr
The proof is complete.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof: We want to show that β(P ) is positive asymptot-
ically as P →∞. Define the matrices
M1(P ) = ρPG
∗V∗HdW1W∗1H
∗
dVG
M2(P ) = (1− ρ) P
nt − nrG
∗V∗HdW2,QW∗2,QH
∗
dVG
A(P ) = M1(P ) + M2(P ) + σ
2G∗G
Γ(P ) = W1,QW
∗
1,Q −W1W∗1
Z = G∗V∗Hd
and the scalar δ = ρP . Then, we can write:
β(P ) = log det(A(P ) + δ(P )ZΓ(P )Z∗)− log det(A(P )).
Recall the choice W1,Q = Fˆ and W1 = F. Thus, the matrix
Γ(P ) can be rewritten as:
Γ(P ) = FˆFˆ∗ − FF∗
If FˆFˆ∗  FF∗, then it follows that β(P ) ≥ 0 for all P ,
but there is not necessarily true in general. Instead, we show
β(P ) ≥ 0 for large P . Using the perturbation Lemma 3 with
∆(P ) = δ(P )ZΓ(P )Z∗, we obtain
β(P ) ≥ tr(∆(P )(A(P ) + ∆(P ))−1) log(e)
≥ −‖∆(P )‖F ‖(A(P ) + ∆(P ))−1‖F log(e) (28)
3The constant c is given by [21]:
c =
1
(nr(nt − nr))!
nr∏
i=1
(nt − i)!
(nr − i)!
We conclude the proof by showing that ‖∆(P )‖F · ‖(A(P )+
∆(P ))−1‖F = o(1) as P → ∞. To this end, first note the
bounds:
‖∆(P )‖F
= δ(P )‖ZΓ(P )Z∗‖F
≤ δ(P )‖Z‖22‖Γ(P )‖F
=
√
2ρP‖Z‖22dc(F, Fˆ)
≤
√
2P
2‖Z‖222−Nf/N
c1/N
(1 + o(2−Nf/N ))
∣∣∣∣∣
Nf=
N
2 log2 P
(29)
= O(
√
P ) (as P →∞) (30)
where we used the upper bound (27) on the chordal distance in
(29). Next, consider the positive semidefinite matrix M2(P ).
Using the bounds in the proof of Lemma 1 (see (21)), it
follows that:
tr(M2(P ))
=
(1− ρ)P
nt − nr tr(G
∗V∗HdW2,QW∗2,QH
∗
dVG)
=
(1− ρ)P
nt − nr ‖G
∗V∗HdW2,Q‖2F
≤ 2(1− ρ)P
nt − nr dc(F, Fˆ)
2
≤ 4(1− ρ)P
c2/N (nt − nr)2
−2Nf/N (1 + o(2−Nf/N ))
∣∣∣∣∣
Nf=
N
2 log2 P
≤ 4(1− ρ)
c2/N (nt − nr) (1 + o(P
−1/2))
= O(1) (as P →∞) (31)
On the other hand, the sequence of matrices M1(P ) converges
to infinity as P → ∞ since M1(P ) = ρPKconst for some
constant strictly positive definite matrix Kconst 4. Thus, we
have:
‖(A(P ) + ∆(P ))−1‖F
= ‖ (ρPKconst + M2(P ) + σ2G∗G + ∆(P ))−1 ‖F
= P−1‖
(
ρKconst +
{
M2(P ) + σ
2G∗G + ∆(P )
P
})−1
‖F
(32)
Next, we notice that the term in the brackets above is
O(P−1/2) since G is independent of P and from (31) and
(30):
tr
(
M2(P )
P
)
= O(P−1)
‖ ∆(P )
P
‖F = O(P−1/2)
Since the trace of the sequence of positive semidefinite matri-
ces {M2(P )} tends to zero, the sequence of the matrices must
4In fact, the matrix Kconst can be shown to be
Kconst = G
∗V∗C∗CVG = B∗MΛM∗B
where we used the definition of G from (12), M = FU, the eigendecom-
position of P from (20) and the QR decomposition H∗d = FC.
10
converge to zero as well at the same rate [22]. Substituting
these back into (32), we obtain:
‖∆‖F ‖(A(P ) + ∆(P ))−1‖F
= O(
√
PP−1‖
(
ρKconst +O(P
−1/2)I
)−1
‖F )
= O(P−1/2) = o(1) (33)
We thus conclude from (33) and the lower bound (28) that
choosing (P ) = ‖∆(P )‖F ‖(A(P ) + ∆(P ))−1‖F log(e)
yields the desired lower bound since (P ) converges to zero
and β(P ) ≥ −(P ). The proof is complete.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: Let RPs,G denote the achievable rate assuming
perfect CSI and RQs,G denote the achievable rate under the
quantized CSI communication scheme.
The first part of the Theorem will be proven first. With
perfect CSI, a similar argument as the one presented in
Theorem 1 can be used to show:
RPs,G
logP
P→∞−→ ds (34)
Of course, the fact that G∗G is full rank (a.s.) is also used.
Define the secrecy rate difference:
∆Rs,G := R
P
s,G −RQs,G
= TP+ − TP− − TQ+ + TQ− (35)
where the terms TP+ , T
P
− , T
Q
+ , T
Q
− are defined in (15) and (16).
We note that the term −TP− +TQ− is asymptotically negligible
since −TP− + TQ− = o(1) as P →∞. To see this, note:
TP− = log det
(
I +
ρ
nr
HeW1W
∗
1H
∗
e
×
(
1− ρ
nt − nrHeW2W
∗
2H
∗
e +
σ¯2
P
Ine
)−1)
P→∞−→ log det
(
I +
ρ
1− ρ
nt − nr
nr
HeW1W
∗
1H
∗
e
× (HeW2W∗2H∗e)−1
)
=: t∞
where we used the condition ne ≤ nt − nr, implying that
HeW2W
∗
2H
∗
e is invertible. Using the fact that limP→∞Nf =
∞, it follows that W1,Q → W1 and W2,Q → W2 as the
loss due to quantization becomes asymptotically negligible.
Therefore, using a similar technique and taking the limit as
P → ∞, it follows that TQ− → t∞. Thus, we have −TP− +
TQ− → −t∞ + t∞ = 0. Using this in (35), we obtain:
∆Rs,G = T
P
+ − TQ+ + o(1) (36)
Without loss of generality, let us assume Kxs ∼ cP I for the
purposes of analysis since c0P I  Kxs  c1P I. Using the
definitions of TP+ and T
Q
+ , after some algebra, we obtain:
∆Rs,G
∼ log det
 (1− ρ)Pnt − nr G∗V∗HdW2,QW∗2,QH∗dVG︸ ︷︷ ︸
M2(P )
+σ2G∗G

− log det(σ2G∗G)
−
[
log det
(
ρPG∗V∗HdW1,QW∗1,QH
∗
dVG
+ (1− ρ) P
nt − nrG
∗V∗HdW2,QW∗2,QH
∗
dVG + σ
2G∗G
)
− log det (ρPG∗V∗HdW1,QW∗1,QH∗dVG + σ2G∗G) ]
+ o(1)
The term in the brackets is exactly the remainder term β(P )
defined in Lemma 4. Using the result of Lemma 4, there exists
a sequence (P ) converging to zero such that:
∆Rs,G ∼ log det
(
M2(P ) + σ
2G∗G
)
− log det(σ2G∗G)− β(P ) + o(1)
≤ ds log(‖M2(P ) + σ2G∗G‖2)
− ds log(σ2λmin(G∗G)) + (P ) + o(1)
≤ ds log
λmax(G∗G)λmin(G∗G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ(G∗G)
+
‖M2(P )‖2
σ2λmin(G∗G)
+ (P ) + o(1)
≤ ds log
(
κ(G∗G) +
(1− ρ)P‖G∗V∗HdW2,Q‖2F
σ2λmin(G∗G)
)
+ (P ) + o(1) (37)
The term given by P‖G∗V∗HdW2,Q‖2F is O(1) as P →∞,
as the bounds in (31) show. Thus, dividing both sides of (37)
by logP and taking the limit as P →∞, we obtain:
dQs := lim
P→∞
RQs,G
logP
≥ lim
P→∞
RPs,G
logP
− lim
P→∞
ds log(κ(G
∗G) +O(1)) + (P ) + o(1)
logP
= ds − 0 = ds
where we used (34). Since the rate of the quantized CSI
scheme is less than the rate of the perfect CSI scheme, it
follows that dQs ≤ ds. Thus, we conclude that dQs = ds.
The second part of the Theorem now easily follows. Note
that from (36), we have:
δGAP = lim
P→∞
{RPs,G −RQs,G}
= lim
P→∞
{TP+ − TQ+ }
≤ lim
P→∞
log det
(
I +
(1− ρ)
σ2
U(P )(G∗G)−1
)
(38)
where
U(P ) := PG∗V∗HdW2,QW∗2,QH
∗
dVG
11
is a positive semidefinite matrix depending on P . From the
development in (31), using the scaling in (17), we obtain:
tr(U(P )) = P‖G∗V∗HdW2,Q‖2F
≤ 2Pdc(F, Fˆ)2
≤ 8P
c2/N
2−2Nf/N (1 + o(2−
Nf
N ))
∣∣∣∣∣
Nf=
(1+)N
2 log2 P
= O(P−)
As a result, tr(U(P )) = o(1), implying U(P )→ 0 as P →∞
[22]. Using this result in (38), we have δGAP ≤ 0. The final
result following by noting that δGAP is always nonnegative.
The proof is complete.
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